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Offers to settle – by the rules 
Defendants’ offer to settle – inclusion of non-monetary terms – requirement for consent 
discontinuance – implication for costs orders – whether judgment not more favourable to 
plaintiff than offer to settle 
In Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 408 Byrne SJA concluded that an offer to settle could be an 
“offer to settle” under Chapter 9 Part 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) 
(UCPR) despite the inclusion of non-monetary terms. His Honour took a different approach 
to that taken by Moynihan SJA in Taske v Occupational & Medical Innovations Ltd [2007] 
QSC 147. 
Facts 
The defendants served the plaintiff with an offer to settle the plaintiff’s claim against the 
defendants made in accordance with Chapter 9 Part 5 of the UCPR in September 2008. The 
offer was to pay the amount of $300,000 plus standard costs. 
The offer included terms specifying that the payment was without prejudice or admission of 
liability and requiring that the terms of the offer and any consequent settlement be kept 
confidential. The offer further stipulated “that these proceedings be discontinued by 
consent within 14 days of payment of the settlement monies specified herein”. There were 
also various specifications in the offer relating to injuries sustained by one Malone, who was 
a passenger in the plaintiff’s boat when both men were injured. 
Although the monetary amount of the offer exceeded the judgment sum awarded on the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages (Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 192), the plaintiff resisted an 
order under r361(2)(b) of the UCPR to pay the defendant’s costs after service of the offer. 
Legislation  
Rule 353(1) of the UCPR permits a party to a proceeding to serve on another party to the 
proceeding “an offer to settle 1 or more of the claims in the proceeding on the conditions 
specified in the offer to settle”. 
Rule 361 of the UCPR provides, so far as is relevant: 
 
361. Costs if offer to settle by defendant 
(1) This rule applies if— 
(a) the defendant makes an offer to settle that is not accepted by the plaintiff and 
the plaintiff obtains a judgment that is not more favourable to the plaintiff than the 
offer to settle; … 
(2) Unless a party shows another order for costs is appropriate in the circumstances, the 
court must— 
(a) order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs, calculated on the standard basis, 
up to and including the day of service of the offer to settle; and 
(b) order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs, calculated on the standard basis, 
after the day of service of the offer to settle. 
Was there an ‘offer to settle’ under Chapter 9 Part 5? 
It was argued for the plaintiff that the inclusion of the confidentiality condition, the 
requirement for consent discontinuance and the specification that the offer was “without 
prejudice” to issues in proceedings involving Mr Malone meant that the offer was not an 
“offer to settle” under Part 5 of Chapter 9 of the UCPR. 
The plaintiff relied on remarks made by Moynihan SJA in Taske v Occupational & Medical 
Innovations Ltd [2007] QSC 147 about the inclusion of non-monetary terms in offers to 
settle. In that case the plaintiff had claimed damages for wrongful dismissal. The defendant 
offered to compromise that claim for an amount that exceeded the compensation awarded 
by the judgment. However, the offer was expressed to be conditional on the discontinuance 
of the proceedings; the release of the defendant from all claims, including claims in respect 
of an employee’s share ownership plan and other claims pursued in separate defamation 
proceedings; and the compromise being kept confidential. Moynihan SJA regarded the offer 
as not complying with the procedural requirements of Part 5, on the basis that it extended 
beyond the claims in the proceeding. 
It was noted that the remarks relied on by the plaintiff may have referred only to the release 
in respect of claims other than those pursued in the proceeding. Byrne SJA proceeded, 
however, on the assumption favourable to the plaintiff that the remarks were intended to 
convey that the requirements relating to discontinuance and confidentiality rendered the 
offer non-compliant. 
His Honour found that this proposition was not easily reconciled with either the text or the 
objects of the UCPR. 
Byrne SJA observed that r353(1) of the UCPR does not preclude the inclusion of a condition 
for the resolution of other contests between the parties and found that the broadly 
expressed provision in the subrule is at odds with the notion that an offer which extends 
beyond the claims in the proceeding is not an “offer to settle”. His Honour also found that 
there is nothing in any other rule in the UCPR which indicates that an offer is non-compliant 
if it includes a term that extends “beyond the claims in the proceeding”. 
Byrne SJA also regarded the restrictive approach in Taske as inconsistent with the apparent 
objectives of the Part 5 regime, particularly the encouragement of early compromise. His 
Honour referred to the observations of Macdonald J on the Canadian equivalent to Part 5 
(the Ontario rules were the source of Part 5) in Hunger Project v Council on Mind Abuse 
(COMA) Inc (1995) 22 OR (3d) 29l 121 DLR (4th) 734; (1995) Can LII 7390 at [20], to the effect 
that the rules provide substantial scope for innovative offers which incorporate the interests 
of litigants rather than reflect the rigidity of rights and remedies. He also referred to the 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Rooney (Litigation Guardian of) v Gray 53 OR (3d) 
685, 198 DLR (4th) 1; 2001 CanLII 24064. That court concluded that an offer to settle that 
had sought party and party costs to the date of the offer and solicitor and client costs 
thereafter, though in some measure uncertain, was still an offer under the rules. 
Byrne SJA was also of the view that Part 5 already provides a substantial incentive to avoid 
complicating an offer to settle unduly, in that the offer must permit fairly ready comparison 
between the nature and extent of the advantages and any disadvantages arising from the 
judgment, with the situation which would have been obtained had the offer been accepted. 
This encourages clarity in the description of the benefits the offeree will derive by the 
acceptance of the offer. His Honour concluded that the Taske restriction on the range of 
compliant offers was unnecessary for the proper functioning of the Part 5 scheme. 
It was noted that the approach in Takse had some support in Victoria. In White v Director of 
Housing [2003] VSC 124, Gillard J concluded terms relating to a release and to 
confidentiality took the offer outside of the equivalent Victorian Rules. Byne SJA concluded, 
however, that the judicial opinion in Ontario was preferable, and that the plaintiff’s 
contention that the 2008 offer was not a compliant “offer to settle” because its terms 
“extended beyond the claims in the proceeding” failed. 
 
Comparison between offer and judgment 
 
The plaintiff also relied on the decision in Taske to support a contention that the 2008 offer 
was not more favourable to the plaintiff than the judgment. In addition to the offer outlined 
above, there was a second offer by the defendants in that case which was expressed to be 
conditional on the execution of a deed of settlement and release in terms to be agreed by 
the parties. Moynihan J regarded that condition as something that would not be part of any 
judgment and found it to follow from this that the offers were not more favourable than the 
judgment. 
In light of the breadth of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, Byrne 
SJA doubted that the conditions of the 2008 offer could not be incorporated into a 
judgment and he noted no authority had been cited to support that contention. However, in 
his Honour’s judgment, even if it was this did not necessarily mean the offer must be no 
more favourable to the plaintiff than the judgment. His Honour referred to the decision of 
the Queensland Court of Appeal in Timms v Clift [1998] 2 Qd R 100. The plaintiff’s offer to 
settle in that case included a requirement that an apology be published. The award of 
damages was higher than the sums sought in the offer to settle and the court concluded 
that “the result of the judgment, including ‘ample vindication’ of the plaintiff’s position, was 
more favourable than the offer”. Byrne SJA regarded it as following from this decision that 
the presence of the conditions in the 2008 offer did not compel a conclusion that the offer 
was not more favourable than the judgment. His Honour then turned to consider whether 
the judgment was in fact “not more favourable to the plaintiff” than the 2008 offer. 
Although the plaintiff conceded he could not be disadvantaged by the other terms, he 
argued that the term requiring a consent discontinuance exposed him to a burden which 
meant that the defendants had not proved that the 2008 offer bettered the judgment. The 
plaintiff submitted that the defendants could have relied on r307(1)(a) (Discontinuance and 
withdrawal – costs) to seek to recover their entire costs of the proceeding from the plaintiff. 
Byrne SJA noted that, at the time the 2008 offer was made, the UCPR did not oblige the 
parties to inform the court when their litigation was compromised. The difficulties this 
created were addressed with the introduction of r308A in 2010, which requires parties to 
notify the registrar when a proceeding settles. His Honour noted the new rule is headed 
“Discontinuance… When Proceedings Settled”. 
Byrne SJA explained, however, that although before the commencement of the new rule 
solicitors sometimes chose a notice of discontinuance to inform the registry that the 
litigation was at an end, it was strictly the case that the proceeding was not discontinued 
but rather that it was settled on terms which precluded the relitigation of the claim. In his 
Honour’s view, this was what was envisaged by the relevant term in the 2008 offer. His 
Honour was satisfied that if the plaintiff had accepted the offer and the defendants had 
afterwards claimed costs under r307(1), the defendants would have failed. In any event, 
there was never any likelihood that the defendants would have made this demand. He 
concluded that this term did not involve disadvantage to the plaintiff and that the judgment 
was not more favourable to the plaintiff than the 2008 offer. 
 
Order 
 
As the defendants were entitled to the benefit of the 2008 offer, the order was that the 
defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs on the standard basis to the date of service of the offer 
to settle and that the plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs after that date on the standard 
basis. 
 
Comment 
It should be acknowledged that there are other quite recent cases in which the courts have 
taken a similar approach to that in Taske – see for example, Armstrong v Mitchell-Smith and 
Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (No.2) [2012] QSC 370. 
The approach in Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 192, if followed, means that parties have more 
freedom than may previously have been the case to construct terms of offers to settle 
which take account of their particular interests without thereby excluding themselves from 
the Chapter 9 Part 5 regime. It is clear, however, that the focus remains whether the 
judgment overall meets the tests prescribed by rules 360 (offers by plaintiff) or 361 (offers 
by defendant) of the UCPR. Every care must be taken with the drafting of offers to make the 
comparison required by the applicable rule as clear as possible. 
 
